A first-order epistemic quantum computational semantics with relativistic-like epistemic effects by Sergioli, G et al.
Accepted Manuscript
A first-order epistemic quantum computational semantics with relativistic-like
epistemic effects
Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara, Roberto Giuntini, Roberto Leporini, Giuseppe Sergioli
PII: S0165-0114(15)00414-5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fss.2015.09.002
Reference: FSS 6897
To appear in: Fuzzy Sets and Systems
Received date: 12 September 2014
Revised date: 22 August 2015
Accepted date: 2 September 2015
Please cite this article in press as: M.L. Dalla Chiara et al., A first-order epistemic quantum computational semantics with
relativistic-like epistemic effects, Fuzzy Sets and Systems (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fss.2015.09.002
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are
providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting
proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could
affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
A FIRST-ORDER EPISTEMIC QUANTUM
COMPUTATIONAL SEMANTICS WITH
RELATIVISTIC-LIKE EPISTEMIC EFFECTS
MARIA LUISA DALLA CHIARA, ROBERTO GIUNTINI, ROBERTO LEPORINI,
AND GIUSEPPE SERGIOLI
Abstract. Quantum computation has suggested new forms of quan-
tum logic, called quantum computational logics. In these logics well-
formed formulas are supposed to denote pieces of quantum information:
possible pure states of quantum systems that can store the information
in question. At the same time, the logical connectives are interpreted as
quantum logical gates: unitary operators that process quantum informa-
tion in a reversible way, giving rise to quantum circuits. Quantum com-
putational logics have been mainly studied as sentential logics (whose
alphabet consists of atomic sentences and of logical connectives). In this
article we propose a semantic characterization for a ﬁrst-order epistemic
quantum computational logic, whose language can express sentences like
“Alice knows that everybody knows that she is pretty”. One can prove
that (unlike the case of logical connectives) both quantiﬁers and epis-
temic operators cannot be generally represented as (reversible) quantum
logical gates. The “act of knowing” and the use of universal (or exis-
tential) assertions seem to involve some irreversible “theoretic jumps”,
which are similar to quantum measurements. Since all epistemic agents
are characterized by speciﬁc epistemic domains (which contain all pieces
of information accessible to them), the unrealistic phenomenon of logical
omniscience is here avoided: knowing a given sentence does not imply
knowing all its logical consequences.
Keywords: Quantum computation, quantum computational logics, epis-
temic operators.
1. Introduction
The theory of quantum computation has inspired the development of new
forms of quantum logics that have been termed quantum computational log-
ics. As is well known, the basic idea of the theory of quantum computers is
using as a “positive resource” two characteristic concepts of quantum the-
ory that had been for a long time described as “mysterious” and potentially
paradoxical: superposition and entanglement . In quantum computation any
piece of information is identiﬁed with a possible state of a quantum system
(say, a photon-system) that can store and transmit the information in ques-
tion. In the happiest situations a state corresponds to a maximal piece of
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information (about the system) that cannot be consistently extended to a
richer knowledge. Such states are called pure. Due to the characteristic in-
determinism of quantum theory, a pure state is at the same time a maximal
and a logically incomplete piece of information that cannot decide some im-
portant properties of the corresponding physical system. Accordingly, from
an intuitive point of view, one can say that any pure state describes a kind of
cloud of potential properties that might become actual when a measurement
is performed, giving rise to the so called collapse of the wave-function. The
concept of superposition represents a mathematical realization of this intu-
itive idea. Any possible pure state of a quantum system S is identiﬁed with
a unit-vector of an appropriate Hilbert space HS and can be represented as
a superposition of other unit-vectors that belong to a basis of the space. By
adopting a notation introduced by Dirac, it is customary to write:
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci|ϕi〉,
where ci are complex numbers such that
∑
i |ci|2 = 1. The physical inter-
pretation is the following: the system S that is in state |ψ〉 might satisfy the
physical properties that are certain for the state |ϕi〉 with probability-value
|ci|2. Apparently, any pure state |ψ〉 describes a parallel system of diﬀerent
pieces of quantum information (|ϕi〉). Just this parallelism is responsible for
the extraordinary eﬃciency and speed of quantum computers.
Another powerful resource of quantum computation is due to the use of
some “strange” pure states, called entangled , that turn out to violate the
classical principle of compositionality . A paradigmatic case of entanglement
may concern a composite physical system S consisting of two subsystems
S1 and S2 (say, a two-electron system). The observer has a maximal in-
formation about S, represented by a pure state |ψ〉. What can be said
about the states of the two subsystems? Due to the form of |ψ〉 and to the
quantum-theoretic rules that concern the mathematical description of com-
posite physical systems, such states cannot be pure: they are represented by
two identical mixed states, which codify a “maximal degree” of uncertainty.
Consequently, the information about the global systems (S) cannot be re-
constructed as a function of the pieces of information about its parts (S1,
S2). In such cases, information seems to ﬂow from the whole to the parts
(and not the other way around). Phenomena of this kind give rise to the
so called holistic features of quantum theory. Interestingly enough, entan-
gled states are currently used in teleportation-experiments and in quantum
cryptography.
As expected, quantum computation cannot be identiﬁed with a “static”
representation of pieces of information. What is important is the dynamic
process of information that gives rise to quantum computations (performed
by quantum circuits). Such process is mathematically realized by quan-
tum logical gates (brieﬂy, gates): special examples of unitary operators that
transform pure states into pure states in a reversible way. Since in quantum
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theory the time-evolution of physical systems is mathematically described by
unitary operators, one can say that quantum computations can be regarded
as the time-evolution of some special quantum objects.
Quantum computational logics can be described as a logical abstraction
from the theory of quantum circuits. The basic idea that underlies the
semantic characterization of these logics can be sketched as follows:
• well formed formulas are supposed to denote pieces of quantum in-
formation: possible states of quantum systems that can store the
information in question;
• the logical connectives correspond to some gates that can process
quantum information.
In this way, connectives turn out to have way a dynamic character, repre-
senting possible computation-actions. At the same time, any formula can
be regarded as a synthetic logical description of a quantum circuit, which
may have a characteristic parallel structure.
Quantum computational logics have been mainly studied as sentential
logics (whose alphabet consists of atomic sentences and of logical connec-
tives). Diﬀerent choices of the system of primitive connectives and of the
basic semantic deﬁnitions give rise to diﬀerent logics. We will refer here to
a holistic version of the quantum computational semantics, where quantum
entanglement is used as a “semantic resource”: generally, the meaning of
a compound expression determines the contextual meanings of its subex-
pressions (and not the other way around, as happens in the case of most
compositional semantic approaches).
The logics characterized by this holistic semantics represent weak forms
of quantum logic, where important classical properties of the “Boolean con-
nectives” are generally violated. Like in fuzzy logics, conjunctions and dis-
junctions are not generally idempotent (according to the slogan “repetita
iuvant!”) and the non-contradiction principle is not valid. Furthermore,
commutativity, associativity and distributivity for conjunctions and disjunc-
tions do not generally hold.
In this article we propose a semantic characterization for a ﬁrst-order
epistemic quantum computational logic, whose language can express sen-
tences like “Alice knows that everybody knows that she is pretty”. As is
well known, most semantic approaches to epistemic logics that can be found
in the literature have been developed in the framework of a Kripke-style
semantics. We will follow here a diﬀerent approach, whose aim is represent-
ing both quantiﬁers and epistemic operators as “genuine” quantum concepts
(living in a Hilbert-space environment). In this perspective, the following
question arises: to what extent is it possible to interpret the quantiﬁers and
the epistemic operators as special examples of quantum operations? Inter-
estingly enough, these logical operators turn out to have a similar semantic
behavior, giving rise to a kind of “reversibility-breaking”: one can prove
that (unlike the case of logical connectives) both quantiﬁers and epistemic
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operators cannot be generally represented as quantum logical gates (which
are reversible unitary operations). The “act of knowing” and the use of uni-
versal (or existential) assertions seem to involve some irreversible “theoretic
jumps”, which are similar to quantum measurements (where the collapse of
the wave-function comes into play).
A characteristic feature of the epistemic quantum computational seman-
tics is the use of the notion of truth-perspective: each epistemic agent (say,
Alice, Bob, ...) is supposed to be associated to a truth-perspective that is
mathematically determined by the choice of a particular orthonormal basis
of the two-dimensional Hilbert space C2. Truth-perspective changes give
rise to some interesting relativistic-like epistemic eﬀects: if Alice and Bob
have diﬀerent truth-perspectives, Alice might see a kind of deformation in
Bob’s logical behavior. Epistemic agents are also characterized by speciﬁc
epistemic domains that contain all pieces of information accessible to them.
Due to the limits of such domains the unrealistic phenomenon of logical
omniscience is here avoided: Alice might know a given sentence without
knowing all its logical consequences.1
As happens in the case of knowledge operators, quantiﬁers also can be
interpreted as special examples of generally irreversible quantum operations.
Unlike most semantic approaches, the models of the ﬁrst-order quantum
computational semantics do not refer to any domain of individuals dealt with
as a closed set (in a classical sense). The interpretation of a universal formula
does not require here any “ideal tests” that should be performed on all
elements of a collection of objects (which might be inﬁnite or indeterminate).
2. The mathematical environment
It is expedient to recall some basic concepts of quantum computation
that play an important role in the quantum computational semantics (see,
for instance, [10, 14, 1]). The general mathematical environment is the
n-fold tensor product of the Hilbert space C2:
H(n) := C2 ⊗ . . .⊗ C2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−times
,
where all pieces of quantum information live. The elements |1〉 = (0, 1)
and |0〉 = (1, 0) of the canonical orthonormal basis B(1) of C2 represent, in
this framework, the two classical bits, which can be also regarded as the
canonical truth-values Truth and Falsity, respectively. The canonical basis
of H(n) is the set
B(n) =
{
|x1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |xn〉 : |x1〉, . . . , |xn〉 ∈ B(1)
}
.
1A diﬀerent approach to epistemic quantum logics has been developed in some im-
portant contributions by A. Baltag and S. Smets (see, for instance, [2, 3, 4]). In this
approach information is supposed to be stored by quantum objects; at the same time,
epistemic agents are supposed to communicate in a classical way. On this basis, epistemic
operators are dealt with as classical modalities in a Kripkean framework.
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As usual, we will brieﬂy write |x1, . . . , xn〉 instead of |x1〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |xn〉. By
deﬁnition, a quregister is a unit vector of H(n); while a qubit (or qubit-state)
is a quregister of H(1). Quregisters thus correspond to pure states (maximal
pieces of information about the quantum systems that are supposed to store
a given amount of quantum information). We shall also make reference to
mixed states (or mixtures of quregisters), represented by density operators
ρ of H(n). Of course, any quregister |ψ〉 corresponds to a special example
of a density operator: the projection operator P|ψ〉 that projects over the
closed subspace determined by |ψ〉. We will denote by D(H(n)) the set of all
density operators of H(n), while D = ⋃n {D(H(n))} will represent the set
of all possible pieces of quantum information, brieﬂy called qumixes.
The choice of an orthonormal basis for the space C2 is, obviously, a matter
of convention. One can consider inﬁnitely many bases that are determined
by the application of a unitary operator T to the elements of the canonical
basis. ¿From an intuitive point of view, we can think that the operator
T gives rise to a change of truth-perspective. While in the classical case,
the truth-values Truth and Falsity are identiﬁed with the two classical bits
|1〉 and |0〉, assuming a diﬀerent basis corresponds to a diﬀerent idea of
Truth and Falsity. Since any basis-change in C2 is determined by a unitary
operator, we can identify a truth-perspective with a unitary operator T of
C2. We will write:
|1T〉 = T|1〉; |0T〉 = T|0〉,
and we will assume that |1T〉 and |0T〉 represent, respectively, the truth-
values Truth and Falsity of the truth-perspective T. The canonical truth-
perspective is, of course, determined by the identity operator I of C2. We
will indicate by B
(1)
T the orthonormal basis determined by T; while B
(1)
I will
represent the canonical basis. From a physical point of view, we can suppose
that each truth-perspective is associated to an apparatus that allows one to
measure a given observable.
Any unitary operator T of H(1) can be naturally extended to a unitary
operator T(n) of H(n) (for any n ≥ 1):
T(n)|x1, . . . , xn〉 = T|x1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ T|xn〉.
Accordingly, any choice of a unitary operator T of H(1) determines an
orthonormal basis B
(n)
T for H(n) such that:
B
(n)
T =
{
T(n)|x1, . . . , xn〉 : |x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ B(n)I
}
.
Instead of T(n)|x1, . . . , xn〉 we will also write |x1T , . . . , xnT〉.
The elements of B
(1)
T will be called the T-bits of H(1); while the elements
of B
(n)
T will represent the T-registers of H(n). On this ground the notions of
truth, falsity and probability with respect to any truth-perspective T can be
deﬁned in a natural way.
6 DALLA CHIARA, GIUNTINI, LEPORINI, AND SERGIOLI
Deﬁnition 2.1. (T-true and T-false registers)
• |x1T , . . . , xnT〉 is a T-true register iﬀ |xnT〉 = |1T〉;
• |x1T , . . . , xnT〉 is a T-false register iﬀ |xnT〉 = |0T〉.
In other words, the T-truth-value of a T-register (which corresponds to a
sequence of T-bits) is determined by its last element.2
Deﬁnition 2.2. (T-truth and T-falsity)
• The T-truth of H(n) is the projection operator TP (n)1 that projects
over the closed subspace spanned by the set of all T- true registers;
• the T-falsity of H(n) is the projection operator TP (n)0 that projects
over the closed subspace spanned by the set of all T- false registers.
In this way, truth and falsity are dealt with as mathematical representa-
tives of possible physical properties. Accordingly, by applying the Born-rule,
one can naturally deﬁne the probability-value of any qumix with respect to
the truth-perspective T.
Deﬁnition 2.3. (T-Probability)
For any ρ ∈ D(H(n)),
pT(ρ) := Tr(
TP
(n)
1 ρ),
where Tr is the trace-functional.
We interpret pT(ρ) as the probability that the information ρ satisﬁes the
T-Truth. In the particular case of qubits, we will obviously obtain:
pT(a0|0T〉+ a1|1T〉) = |a1|2.
As is well known, quantum information is processed by quantum logi-
cal gates (brieﬂy, gates): unitary operators that transform quregisters into
quregisters in a reversible way. Let us recall the deﬁnition of some gates
that play a special role both from the computational and from the logical
point of view.
Deﬁnition 2.4. (The Negation)
For any n ≥ 1, the negation on H(n) is the linear operator NOT(n) such that,
for every element |x1, . . . , xn〉 of the canonical basis,
NOT(n)|x1, . . . , xn〉 = |x1, . . . , xn−1〉 ⊗ |1− xn〉.
In particular, we obtain:
NOT(1)|0〉 = |1〉; NOT(1)|1〉 = |0〉.
Hence, the gate NOT(n) represents a natural generalization of the classical
negation.
2As we will shortly see, the application of a classical gate to a register |x1, . . . , xn〉
transforms the bit |xn〉 into the target-bit |x′n〉, which determines the ﬁnal truth-value.
This justiﬁes the choice of Def. 2.1.
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Deﬁnition 2.5. (The Toﬀoli-gate)
For any m,n, p ≥ 1, the Toﬀoli-gate is the linear operator T(m,n,p) deﬁned on
H(m+n+p) such that, for every element |x1, . . . , xm〉⊗|y1, . . . , yn〉⊗|z1, . . . , zp〉
of the canonical basis,
T(m,n,p)|x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zp〉
= |x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zp−1〉 ⊗ |xm · yn+̂zp〉,
where · is the product, while +̂ represents the addition modulo 2.
For m = n = p = 1, we obtain:
T(1,1,1)|x, y, z〉 = |x, y, x · y +̂ z〉.
Consequently, when z = 0, the gate T(1,1,1) gives rise to a reversible repre-
sentation of the classical truth-table for the conjunction:
|1, 1, 0〉 → |1, 1, 1〉; |1, 0, 0〉 → |1, 0, 0〉; |0, 1, 0〉 → |0, 1, 0〉; |0, 0, 0〉 → |0, 0, 0〉.
Deﬁnition 2.6. (The Hadamard-gate)
For any n ≥ 1, the Hadamard-gate on H(n) is the linear operator √I(n) such
that for every element |x1, . . . , xn〉 of the canonical basis:
√
I
(n)|x1, . . . , xn〉 = |x1, . . . , xn−1〉 ⊗ 1√
2
((−1)xn |xn〉+ |1− xn〉) .
In particular we obtain:
√
I
(1)|0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉);√I(1)|1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
Both the negation-gate and the Toﬀoli-gate are examples of classical
gates , that transform registers into registers. The Hadamard-gate is in-
stead a genuine quantum gate that can create superpositions, giving rise to
characteristic parallel computational structures.
All gates can be naturally transposed from the canonical truth-perspective
to any truth-perspective T. Let G(n) be any gate deﬁned with respect to
the canonical truth-perspective. The twin-gate G
(n)
T , deﬁned with respect
to the truth-perspective T, is determined as follows:
G
(n)
T := T
(n)G(n)T(n)
†
,
where T(n)
†
is the adjoint of T(n).
All T-gates can be canonically extended to the set D of all qumixes [12].
Let GT be any gate deﬁned on H(n). The corresponding qumix gate (also
called unitary quantum operation) DGT is deﬁned as follows for any ρ ∈
D(H(n)):
DGTρ = GT ρG
†
T.
For the sake simplicity, also the qumix gates DGT will be brieﬂy called gates.
The Toﬀoli-gate DT
(m,n,p)
T allows us to deﬁne a reversible operation AND
(m,n)
T
that represents a holistic conjunction.
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Deﬁnition 2.7. (The holistic conjunction)
For any m,n ≥ 1 the holistic conjunction AND(m,n)T with respect to the truth-
perspective T is deﬁned as follows for any qumix ρ ∈ D(H(m+n)):
AND
(m,n)
T (ρ) :=
DT
(m,n,1)
T (ρ⊗ TP (1)0 ),
where the T-falsity TP
(1)
0 plays the role of an ancilla.
When T = I, we will also write: AND(m,n) (instead of AND
(m,n)
I ) and p
(instead of pI).
If m = n = 1 and ρ corresponds to the register P|x,y〉 (of the space H(2)),
we obtain:
AND(1,1)(P|x,y〉) = PT(1,1,1)|x,y,0〉.
Hence, AND(1,1)(P|x,y〉) represents the classical conjunction of the two bits |x〉
and |y〉.
It is worth-while noticing that generally
AND
(m,n)
T (ρ) 	= AND(m,n)T (Red(1)[m,n](ρ)⊗Red
(2)
[m,n](ρ)),
where Red
(1)
[m,n](ρ) (which belongs to the space H(m)) and Red
(2)
[m,n](ρ) (which
belongs to the space H(n)) represent the two reduced states that describe,
respectively, the ﬁrst and the second subsystem of the composite system de-
scribed by the global state ρ (which belongs to the space H(m+n)).3 Roughly
speaking, we might say that the holistic conjunction deﬁned on a global in-
formation consisting of two parts does not generally coincide with the con-
junction of the two separate parts. As an example, we can consider the
following qumix (which represents an entangled pure state):
ρ = P 1√
2
(|0,0〉+|1,1〉).
We have:
AND(1,1)(ρ) = DT(1,1,1)(P 1√
2
(|0,0〉+|1,1〉) ⊗ P (1)0 ) = P 1√
2
(|0,0,0〉+|1,1,1〉) ,
which also represents an entangled pure state.
At the same time we have:
AND(1,1)(Red
(1)
[1,1](ρ)⊗Red
(2)
[1,1](ρ)) = AND
(1,1)(
1
2
I(1) ⊗ 1
2
I(1)),
which is a proper mixture.
3We recall that according to the quantum theoretic formalism any possible state of
a composite physical system S consisting of n subsystems (S1, . . . , Sn) is a density op-
erator ρ of the tensor-product space HS = HS1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ HSn (where each HSi is the
Hilbert space associated to the system Si). The state ρ determines n reduced states:
Red(1)(ρ), . . . , Red(n)(ρ), where each Red(i)(ρ) is a density operator of HSi that repre-
sents the state of Si. Generally, we have: ρ = Red(1)(ρ) ⊗ . . . ⊗ Red(n)(ρ). In other
words, the state of the global system cannot be generally represented as a factorized state
determined by the tensor product of the states of its parts.
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Furthermore, we have:
p(AND(1,1)(ρ)) =
1
2
; p(AND(1,1)(Red
(1)
[1,1](ρ)⊗Red
(2)
[1,1](ρ))) =
1
4
.
3. A first-order epistemic quantum computational language
Let us ﬁrst introduce the language that will be used. This language,
indicated by L, contains:
• sentential constants (q,q1,q2, . . .) including two privileged sentences
t and f that represent the truth-values Truth and Falsity , respec-
tively;
• individual names (a,b, . . .) and individual variables (x, y, . . .);
• m-ary predicates Pmi (with 1 ≤ m);
• the following logical connectives: the negation ¬ (which corresponds
to the gate Negation), the square root of the identity
√
id (which
corresponds to the Hadamard -gate), a ternary connective ᵀ (which
corresponds to the Toﬀoli -gate);
• the universal quantiﬁer ∀;
• the epistemic operator K (to know).
We will use t, t1, . . . as metavariables for individual terms (either names
or variables). The notions of formula and of sentence are deﬁned in the
expected way.
• Sentential constants and expressions having the form Pmi t1 . . . tm are
(atomic) formulas;
• if α, β, γ are formulas, then the expressions ¬α, √id α, ᵀ(α, β, γ)
are formulas;
• for any formula α(x), the expression ∀xα(x) is a formula;
• for any term t and any formula α, the expression Ktα (t knows α)
is a formula.
Any expression Kt represents an epistemic connective.
Sentences are formulas that do not contain any free variable.
The binary logical conjunction ∧ can be deﬁned by means of the following
metalinguistic deﬁnition:
α ∧ β := ᵀ(α, β, f)
(where the false sentence f plays the role of a syntactical ancilla). This deﬁ-
nition clearly reﬂects, at a syntactical level, the deﬁnition of the holistic con-
junction in terms of the Toﬀoli-gate (AND
(m,n)
T (ρ) :=
DT
(m,n,1)
T (ρ⊗ TP (1)0 )).
The binary inclusive disjunction ∨ and the existential quantiﬁer ∃ are
metalinguistically deﬁned as follows:
α ∨ β := ¬(¬α ∧ ¬β); ∃xα := ¬∀x¬α.
Any formula α can be naturally decomposed into its parts, giving rise to
a special conﬁguration called the syntactical tree of α. Such conﬁguration
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(indicated by STreeα) can be represented as a ﬁnite sequence of levels:
Levelαh
...
Levelα1
where:
• each Levelαi (with 1 ≤ i ≤ h) is a sequence (βi1 , . . . , βir) of subfor-
mulas of α;
• the bottom level Levelα1 is (α);
• the top level Levelαh is the sequence (atα1 , . . . , atαk ) of the atomic
subformulas occurring in α;
• for any i (with 1 ≤ i < h), Levelαi+1 is the sequence obtained by drop-
ping the principal logical connective, the principal epistemic connec-
tive and the principal quantiﬁer in all molecular formulas occurring
at Levelαi , and by repeating all the atomic formulas that occur at
Levelαi .
By Height of α (indicated by Height(α)) we mean the number h of levels
of the syntactical tree of α.
Example 3.1.
α = P1a ∧ ¬P1a = ᵀ(P1a,¬P1a, f).
The syntactical tree of α is the following sequence of sequences of subfor-
mulas of α:
Levelα3 = (P
1a,P1a, f)
Levelα2 = (P
1a,¬P1a, f)
Levelα1 = (ᵀ(P1a,¬P1a, f))
We have: Height(α) = 3.
We will now deﬁne the notion of atomic structure of a formula α (which
will play an important semantic role). Consider ﬁrst a simple example: the
case of an atomic formula P1t. The underlying semantic idea is that the
information corresponding to P1t can be stored by three qumixes: the ﬁrst
qumix is supposed to store the information described by the predicate P1;
the second qumix stores the information described by the term t; the third
qumix stores the “truth-degree” according to which the object denoted by
t satisﬁes the property denoted by P1.
Notice that, according to this idea, the same type of information is sup-
posed to store both predicates and individual terms. Unlike classical set-
theoretic semantics, we do not refer to any ontological hierarchy.
In the case of an atomic formula having the form Pmt1 . . . tm, we will need
m+2 qumixes; while for a sentential constant, one qumix will be suﬃcient.
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Accordingly, we can assume that the atomic structure of Pmt1 . . . tm is (m+
2); while (1) is the atomic structure of a sentential constant.
In the general case, the notion of atomic structure of a formula α is deﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1. (Atomic structure)
Consider a formula α such that:
Levelαh = (at
α
1 , . . . , at
α
k ),
where h is the Height of α. The atomic structure of α is a sequence of
natural numbers
AtStr(α) = (n1, . . . , nk),
such that:
ni =
{
1, if atαi is a sentential constant;
2 +m, if atαi = P
mt1 . . . tm.
If AtStr(α) = (n1, . . . , nk), the number n1 + . . .+ nk is called the atomic
complexity of α (indicated by At(α)).
Semantically, the atomic structure of α is important because it determines
the Hilbert space Hα that represents the semantic space of α, where any
possible meaning for α shall live. Let AtStr(α) = (n1, . . . , nk). We write:
Hα = H(n1) ⊗ . . .⊗H(nk) = H(n1+...+nk) = HAt(α).
Example 3.2. Consider again the formula α = ᵀ(P1a,¬P1a, f). We have:
AtStr(α) = (3, 3, 1); At(α) = 7; Hα = H(7).
4. A Holistic quantum computational semantics
The basic intuitive idea of the holistic quantum computational semantics
can be sketched as follows [9, 8]. For any choice of a truth-perspective, any
model of the language assigns to any formula α a global informational mean-
ing that lives in Hα (the semantic space of α). This meaning determines the
contextual meanings of all subformulas of α (from the whole to the parts!).
It may happen that one and the same model assigns to a given formula
α diﬀerent contextual meanings in diﬀerent contexts. One obtains, in this
way, a semantic situation that is quite similar to what happens in the case
of entanglement-phenomena.
It is expedient to consider ﬁrst the semantics for a fragment L− of L
consisting of all formulas that do not contain any occurrence either of ∀ or
of K. In such a case, for any choice of a truth-perspective T, the syntactical
tree of any formula α uniquely determines a sequence of gates, all deﬁned
on the semantic space of α.
As an example, consider again the formula
α = P1a ∧ ¬P1 = ᵀ(P1a,¬P1a, f).
In the syntactical tree of α the second level has been obtained from the
third level by repeating the ﬁrst occurrence of P1a, by negating the second
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occurrence of P1a and by repeating f , while the ﬁrst level has been obtained
by applying the connective ᵀ to the sequence of formulas occurring at the
second level. Accordingly, one can say that, for any choice of a truth-
perspective T, the syntactical tree of α uniquely determines the following
sequence consisting of two gates, both deﬁned on the semantic space of α:(
DI
(3)
T ⊗ DNOT(3)T ⊗ DI(1)T , DT(3,3,1)T
)
.
Such a sequence is called the T-gate tree of α. This procedure can be natu-
rally generalized to any formula α. The general form of the T- gate tree of
α will be:
(DGαT(h−1) , . . . ,
DGαT(1)),
where h is the Height of α.
¿From an intuitive point of view, any formula α of L can be regarded
as a synthetic logical description of a quantum circuit that may assume as
inputs qumixes living in the semantic space of α. For instance, the circuit
described by the formula
α = ¬(q ∧ ¬q) = ¬ ᵀ (q,¬q, f)
(which asserts the non-contradiction principle) can be represented as follows:
Thus, L-formulas turn out to have a characteristic dynamic character, rep-
resenting systems of computation-actions.
Before deﬁning the concept of holistic model , it is expedient to introduce
the weaker notion of holistic map for the language L−.
Deﬁnition 4.1. (Holistic map)
A holistic map for L− (associated to a truth-perspective T) is a map HolT
that assigns a meaning HolT(Level
α
i ) to each level of the syntactical tree of
α, for any formula α. This meaning is a qumix living in the semantic space
of α.
On this basis, the meaning assigned by HolT to the formula α is deﬁned
as follows: HolT(α) := HolT(Level
α
1 ).
Given a formula γ, any holistic map HolT determines the contextual mean-
ing, with respect to the context HolT(γ), of any occurrence in γ of a subfor-
mula, of a predicate, of a term. The intuitive idea is the following: HolT(γ)
can be regarded as the state of a composite quantum system S that stores
the information expressed by γ, while the subexpressions of γ correspond to
the states of particular subsystems of S, which are determined by the global
state HolT(γ). Accordingly, the contextual meaning of a subexpression of γ
can be naturally deﬁned by using the notion of reduced state.
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Deﬁnition 4.2. (Contextual meaning of an occurrence of a subformula)
Consider a formula γ such that Levelγi = (βi1 , . . . , βir). We have: Hγ =
Hβi1 ⊗ . . . ⊗Hβir . Let HolT be a holistic map. The contextual meaning of
the occurrence βij with respect to the context HolT(γ) is deﬁned as follows:
Hol
γ
T(βij ) := Red
(j)
[At(βi1 ),...,At(βir )]
(HolT(Leveli(γ))).
Of course, we obtain:
Hol
γ
T(γ) = HolT(γ).
Deﬁnition 4.3. (Contextual meaning of an occurrence of a predicate and
of a term)
Consider a formula γ such that Levelγi = (βi1 , . . . , βir) and let βij = P
mt1 . . . tm.
Consider a holistic map HolT. The contextual meanings of the occurrences
of Pm and of tk (with 1 ≤ k ≤ m) in βij with respect to the context HolT(γ)
are deﬁned as follows:
Hol
(γ,βij )
T (P
m) := Red
(1)
[1,m+1](Hol
γ
T(βij ));
Hol
(γ,βij )
T (tk) := Red
(2)
[k,1,m+2−(k+1)](Hol
γ
T(βij )).
Deﬁnition 4.4. (Normal holistic map)
A holistic map HolT is called normal iﬀ the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(1) for any formula γ, HolT assigns the same contextual meaning to
all occurrences of a subformula (of a predicate, of a term) in the
syntactical tree of γ.
(2) The contextual meanings assigned by HolT to the false sentence f
and to the true sentence t are the T-Falsity TP
(1)
0 and the T-Truth
TP
(1)
1 , respectively.
We can now deﬁne the concept of holistic model of the language L−.
Unlike holistic maps, holistic models shall preserve the logical form of any
formula α, by interpreting the logical connectives as the corresponding gates.
Deﬁnition 4.5. (Holistic model)
A holistic model of L− is a normal holistic map HolT that satisﬁes the
following condition for any formula α: if (DGαT(h−1) , . . . ,
DGαT(1)) is the T-
gate tree of α and 1 ≤ i < h, then,
HolT(Level
α
i ) =
DGαT(i)(HolT(Level
α
i+1)).
In other words, the meaning of each level (diﬀerent from the top level) is
obtained by applying the corresponding gate to the meaning of the level that
occurs immediately above.
On this basis, we put:
HolT(α) := HolT(Level
α
1 ),
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for any formula α.
Notice that any HolT(α) represents a kind of autonomous semantic con-
text that is not necessarily correlated with the meanings of other formulas.
Generally we have:
Hol
γ
T(β) 	= HolδT(β).
Thus, one and the same formula may receive diﬀerent contextual meanings
in diﬀerent contexts (as, in fact, happens in the case of our normal use of
natural languages).
Consider now a formula α whose atomic complexity is n. By deﬁnition
of model we have: HolT(α) ∈ D(H(n)). From an intuitive point of view,
the qumix Red
(2)
[n−1,1](HolT(α)) (which lives the space C
2) can be regarded
as a generalized truth-value of α (determined by the model HolT). At the
same time, the number pT(Hol(α)) represents the probability-value of α
with respect to the truth-perspective T (determined by the model HolT).
Accordingly, our semantics can be described as a two-level many valued se-
mantics, where for any choice of a model HolT, any formula receives two
correlated semantic values: a generalized truth-value (represented by a den-
sity operator of C2) and a probability-value (a real number in the interval
[0, 1]).
Now the concepts of truth, validity and logical consequence can be deﬁned
in terms of the probability-function pT.
Deﬁnition 4.6. (Truth)
A formula α is called true with respect to a model HolT (abbreviated as
|=HolT α) iﬀ pT(HolT(α)) = 1.
Deﬁnition 4.7. (Validity)
1) α is called T-valid (|=T α) iﬀ for any model HolT, |=HolT α.
2) α is called valid (|= α) iﬀ for any truth-perspective T, |=T α.
Deﬁnition 4.8. (Logical consequence)
1) β is called a T-logical consequence of α (α T β) iﬀ for any formula
γ such that α and β are subformulas of γ and for any model HolT,
pT(Hol
γ
T(α)) ≤ pT(HolγT(β)).
2) β is called a logical consequence of α (α  β) iﬀ for any truth-
perspective T, α T β.
When α I β, we say that β is a canonical logical consequence of α.
The concept of logical consequence turns out to be invariant with respect
to truth-perspective changes.
Lemma 4.1. [8]
α  β iﬀ α I β iﬀ there is a truth-perspective T such that α T β.
Although the holistic semantics is strongly context-dependent, one can
prove that the logical consequence-relation is reﬂexive and transitive.
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Theorem 4.1. [11]
(1) α  α;
(2) α  β and β  δ ⇒ α  δ.
The concept of logical consequence, deﬁned in this semantics, character-
izes a special form of holistic quantum computational logic. One is dealing
with a very weak form of quantum logic, where some standard logical argu-
ments are generally violated [11]. We have, for instance:
(1) α  α ∧ α
(2) α ∧ β  β ∧ α
(3) α ∧ (β ∧ δ)  (α ∧ β) ∧ δ
(4) (α ∧ β) ∧ δ  α ∧ (β ∧ δ)
(5) α ∧ (β ∨ δ)  (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ δ)
(6) (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ δ)  α ∧ (β ∨ δ)
(7) δ  α and δ  β  δ  α ∧ β
(8)  ¬(α ∧ ¬α)
(9) α ∧ ¬α  β
Some important logical consequences that hold in this logic are the fol-
lowing:
(1) α ∧ β  α; α ∧ β  β
(2) α  β ⇒ α ∧ δ  β
(3) ¬¬α  α; α  ¬¬α.
(4) α  β ⇒ ¬β  ¬α
(5) f  β; β  t
Since the conjunction ∧ is generally non-associative, brackets cannot be
omitted in the case of multiple conjunctions. We will use the expression
β1 ∧ . . . ∧ βn as a metalinguistic abbreviation for any possible bracket-
conﬁguration in a multiple conjunction whose members are the elements
of the sequence (β1, . . . , βn).
5. An epistemic quantum computational semantics
We will now investigate the semantics for the language L−Ep, which repre-
sents the epistemic extension of L− that includes all quantiﬁer-free epistemic
formulas of L.4 This semantics is based on the following intuitive idea: any
occurrence of an epistemic operator K in a formula α is interpreted as a
special example of a qumix-operation representing a knowledge-operation
associated to a given epistemic agent, which is characterized by a partic-
ular truth-perspective. Of course “real” agents evolve in time, changing
their knowledge; for the sake of simplicity, however, in this article we will
abstract from time, assuming that all agents are referred to a particular
“short” time-interval.
4A semantics for a sentential epistemic quantum computational language has been
studied in [6, 7].
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We will ﬁrst introduce the notion of knowledge-operation of a Hilbert
space H(n) with respect to a truth-perspective T:
Deﬁnition 5.1. (Knowledge-operation)
A knowledge-operation of the space H(n) with respect to the truth-perspective
T is a map
K
(n)
T : B(H(n)) → B(H(n)),
where B(H(n)) is the set of all bounded operators of H(n). The following
conditions are required:
(1) K
(n)
T is associated with an epistemic domain EpD(K
(n)
T ), which is a
subset of D(H(n));
(2) for any ρ ∈ D(H(n)), K(n)T ρ ∈ D(H(n));
(3) pT(K
(n)
T ρ) ≤ pT(ρ), for any ρ ∈ EpD(K(n)T );
(4) ∀ρ ∈ D(H(n)) : ρ /∈ EpD(K(n)T ) ⇒ K(n)T ρ = ρ0 (where ρ0 is a ﬁxed
density operator of D(H(n))).
As expected, the intuitive interpretation of K
(n)
T ρ is the following: “the
piece of information ρ is known”. The knowledge described byK
(n)
T is limited
by a given epistemic domain (which is intended to represent the information
accessible to a given agent, relatively to the space H(n)).5 Whenever an
information ρ does not belong to the epistemic domain of K
(n)
T , then K
(n)
T ρ
collapses into a ﬁxed element ρ0 (which may be identiﬁed, for instance, with
the maximally uncertain information 12nI
(n) or with the T-Falsity TP
(n)
0 ).
At the same time, whenever ρ belongs to the epistemic domain of K
(n)
T , it
seems reasonable to assume that the probability-values of ρ and K
(n)
T ρ are
correlated: the probability of the quantum information asserting that “ρ is
known” should always be less than or equal to the probability of ρ. Hence,
in particular, we have:
pT(K
(n)
T ρ) = 1 ⇒ pT(ρ) = 1.
But generally, not the other way around! In other words, pieces of quantum
information that are certainly known are certainly true (with respect to the
truth-perspective in question). This condition is clearly in agreement with a
general principle of classical epistemic logics, according to which “knowledge
implies truth, but no the other way around”.
A knowledge-operation K
(n)
T is called non-trivial iﬀ for at least one den-
sity operator ρ ∈ EpD(K(n)T ), pT(K(n)T ρ) < pT(ρ). Notice that knowledge-
operations do not generally preserve pure states [5].
5The epistemic domain of K
(n)
T should not be confused with the domain of K
(n)
T , which
coincides with the set of all bounded operators of the space. In particular, we have that
K
(n)
T ρ is deﬁned, even if ρ does not belong to the epistemic domain of K
(n)
T .
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Can knowledge-operations be described as special examples of gates? The
following theorem gives a negative answer to this question.
Theorem 5.1. [5]
Non-trivial knowledge-operations cannot be represented as unitary quantum
operations.
At the same time knowledge-operations can be represented as qumix op-
erations that are generally irreversible. The act of knowing seems to be
characterized by an intrinsic irreversibility, which is quite similar to quan-
tum measurement-phenomena.
On this basis we can now deﬁne the notions of epistemic situation and of
epistemic realization for the epistemic language L−Ep.
Deﬁnition 5.2. (Epistemic situation)
Let i represent an epistemic agent (say, Alice, Bob, ...). An epistemic situ-
ation for i is a pair
EpSiti = (Ti, Ki),
where:
(1) Ti represents the truth-perspective of i;
(2) Ki is a map that assigns to any n ≥ 1 a knowledge-operation K(n)Ti
(deﬁned on H(n)), which represents the knowledge of i with respect
to the information-environment D(H(n)).
The concept of normal holistic map HolT for the language L−Ep and
the contextual meanings HolγT(t), Hol
γ
T(P
m), HolγT(β) (for any term t, any
predicate Pm and any formula β occurring in γ) are deﬁned like in the case
of the language L−.
Deﬁnition 5.3. (Epistemic realization)
An epistemic realization for the language L−Ep is a pair (HolT,ET), where
HolT is a normal holistic map for the language L−Ep and ET is an epistemic
map that associates to any pair (α, t) consisting of a formula α and of a term
t occurring in an epistemic connective Kt of α an epistemic situation
ET(α, t) = (THolαT(t), KHol
α
T(t)
).
As expected, ET(α, t) represents the epistemic situation of the agent cor-
responding to the contextual meaning of the term t in the context HolT(α).
Notice that generally
T 	= THolαT(t).
In other words, the truth-perspective of the agent denoted by the term t
(according to the map HolT) does not necessarily coincide with the truth-
perspective of the holistic map HolT. In the next Section we will see how
these truth-perspective diﬀerences may cause some interesting relativistic-
like epistemic eﬀects.
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Any epistemic realization (HolT,ET) determines for any formula α a spe-
cial gate tree, called the (HolT,ET) - epistemic pseudo gate tree of α. As an
example, consider the following epistemic sentence:
α = Ka¬KbP1a
(say, Alice knows that Bob does not know that she is pretty).
We have: Hα = H(3). The syntactical tree of α is:
Levelα4 = (P
1a)
Levelα3 = (KbP
1a)
Levelα2 = (¬KbP1a)
Levelα1 = (Ka¬KbP1a)
Let (THolαT(a), KHol
α
T(a)
) and (THolαT(b), KHol
α
T(b)
) be the two epistemic sit-
uations associated by the epistemic realization (HolT,ET) to the two pairs
(α,a) and (α,b). In such a case the (HolT,ET) - epistemic pseudo gate
tree of α can be naturally identiﬁed with the following sequence of qumix
operations:
(K
(3)
THolα
T
(b)
, DNOT
(3)
T , K
(3)
THolα
T
(a)
).
This procedure can be obviously generalized. For any formula α, the
choice of an epistemic realization (HolT,ET) determines the (HolT,ET) -
epistemic pseudo gate tree of α, indicated as follows:
(DG
(HolT,ET)
T(h−1)
, . . . , DG
(HolT,ET)
T(1)
).
Of course, epistemic pseudo gate trees are generally irreversible. It is
worth-while noticing that, unlike the case of L−, epistemic pseudo gate
trees are not uniquely determined by the formulas’ syntactical trees. Any
epistemic realization (HolT,ET) chooses for any α a particular interpretation
of the epistemic connectives occurring in α.
Now the concept of holistic model for the language L−Ep can be deﬁned
in the expected way. Like in the case of L−, any model HolT shall preserve
the logical form of any formula α , by interpreting the epistemic connectives
occurring in α as convenient epistemic operations.
Deﬁnition 5.4. (Holistic model of L−Ep)
A holistic model of L−Ep is an epistemic realization (HolT,ET) that satisﬁes
the following condition for any formula α:
if (DG
(HolT,ET)
T(h−1)
, . . . , DG
(HolT,ET)
T(1)
) is the (HolT,ET) - epistemic pseudo gate
tree of α and 1 ≤ i < h, then,
HolT(Leveli(α)) =
DG
(HolT,ET)
T(i)
(HolT(Leveli+1(α))).
In other words, the meaning of each level (diﬀerent from the top level) is
obtained by applying the corresponding gate (or pseudo gate) to the meaning
of the level that occurs immediately above.
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On this basis the concepts of truth, validity and logical consequence are
deﬁned like in the case of the language L−, mutatis mutandis.6
It is interesting to classify some special kinds of epistemic models that
satisfy particular restrictions.
Deﬁnition 5.5. (Special models)
Let EHolT = (HolT,ET) be a model of L−Ep.
(1) EHolT is called harmonic iﬀ for all epistemic situations (Ti, KTi)
determined by EHolT, Ti = T. Hence, all agents considered by EHolT
share the same truth-perspective T.
(2) EHolT is called sound iﬀ for all epistemic situations (Ti, KTi) deter-
mined by EHolT, the qumixes
TiP
(1)
1 and
TiP
(1)
0 belong to the epis-
temic domain of K
(1)
Ti
. Furthermore, K
(1)
Ti
TiP
(1)
1 =
TiP
(1)
1 and
K
(1)
Ti
TiP
(1)
0 =
TiP
(1)
0 . In other words, any agent i has access to
the truth-values of his/her truth-perspective, assigning to them the
“right” probability-values.
(3) EHolT is called falsity-based iﬀ for any epistemic situation (Ti, KTi)
determined by EHolT, the following condition is satisﬁed: for any
ρ /∈ EpD(K(n)Ti ), K
(n)
Ti
ρ = TiP
(n)
0 .
(4) EHolT is called perfect iﬀ any agent i of an epistemic situation
(Ti, KTi) determined by EHolT has a perfect epistemic capacity, sat-
isfying the following conditions:
(4.1) the epistemic domain of K
(n)
Ti
coincides with the set of all pos-
sible qumixes of H(n) (for any n ≥ 1);
(4.2) for any qumix ρ (∈ D(H(n))), K(n)Ti ρ = ρ. Hence, i assigns the
“right” probability-values to all pieces of information.
Notice that a perfect epistemic capacity does not imply omniscience (i.e.
the capacity of semantically deciding any sentence). For, the semantic
excluded-middle principle:
either EHolT α or EHolT ¬α
does not generally hold (as happens in all forms of quantum logic).
Models that are at the same time harmonic, sound and falsity-based will
be also called simple. By simple epistemic (quantum computational) se-
mantics we will mean the special case of epistemic semantics based on the
assumption that all models are simple.
When α is valid or β is a logical consequence of α in the simple semantics
we will also write:
Simple α; α Simple β.
Let us ﬁnally recall some signiﬁcant examples of epistemic arguments that
are either valid or possibly violated in this semantics.
6In [7] we have considered a diﬀerent concept of logical consequence for the case of a
sentential epistemic quantum computational language.
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1) Ktα Simple α.
In the simple semantics, knowing a formula implies the formula it-
self. Of course this relation does not hold in the general epistemic
semantics, where non-harmonic models may refer to diﬀerent truth-
perspectives of diﬀerent agents.
2) As a particular case of 1) we obtain:
KtαKtα Simple Ktα.
Knowing of knowing implies knowing. But not the other way around!
3) Kt1Kt2α Simple α.
In the simple semantics, knowing that another agent knows a given
formula implies the formula in question. At the same time, we have:
Kt1Kt2α Simple Kt1α.
Alice might know that Bob knows a given formula, without knowing
herself the formula in question!
4) Simple Ktt; Simple Kt¬f .
Hence, there are sentences that everybody knows.
5) Kt(α ∧ β)  Ktα; Kt(α ∧ β)  Ktβ.
Knowing a conjunction does not generally imply knowing its mem-
bers.
6) Ktα ∧ Ktβ  Kt(α ∧ β).
Knowledge is not generally closed under conjunction.
7) For any model EHolT, EHolT Kt(α ∧ ¬α).
Contradictions are never known.
8) In the non-simple semantics (where models are not necessarily har-
monic) the following situation is possible:
EHolT KaKbf .
In other words, according to the truth-perspective of Alice it is
true that Alice knows that Bob knows the Falsity of Alice’s truth-
perspective. Roughly, we might say: Alice knows that Bob is wrong.
However, Bob is not aware of being wrong!
The examples illustrated above seem to reﬂect pretty well some character-
istic limitations of the real processes of acquiring information and knowledge.
Owing to the limits of epistemic domains, knowledge is not generally closed
under logical consequence. Hence, the unpleasant phenomenon of logical
omniscience is here avoided: Alice might know a given sentence without
knowing all its logical consequences. We have, in particular, that knowl-
edge is not generally closed under logical conjunction, in accordance with
what happens in the case of concrete memories both of human and of ar-
tiﬁcial intelligence. It is also admitted that an agent knows a conjunction,
without knowing its members. Such situation, which might appear prima
facie somewhat “irrational”, seems to be instead deeply in agreement with
our use of natural languages, where sometimes agents show to use correctly
and to understand some global expressions without being able to understand
their (meaningful) parts.
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6. Physical examples and relativistic-like epistemic effects
We will now illustrate some examples of knowledge-operations that may
be interesting from a physical point of view. One is dealing with special cases
of quantum channels, which can be, generally, obtained from some unitary
operators, tracing out the ancillary qubits that describe the environment.
Let us ﬁrst recall the deﬁnition of quantum channel (which is based on
the so called Kraus ﬁrst representation theorem [13]).
Deﬁnition 6.1. (Quantum channel)
A quantum channel on H(n) is a linear map E (n) : B(H(n)) → B(H(n))
such that for some set I of indices there exists a set {Ei}i∈I of elements of
B(H(n)) satisfying the following conditions:
(1)
∑
iE
†
iEi = I
(n);
(2) ∀A ∈ B(H(n)) : E(n)(A) =∑iEiAE†i .
A set {Ei}i∈I such that
∑
iE
†
iEi = I
(n) is called a system of Kraus
operators. One can prove that quantum channels are trace-preserving, and
hence transform density operators into density operators.
Of course, unitary quantum operations DG(n) are special cases of quan-
tum channels, for which {Ei}i∈I =
{
G(n)
}
. In the general case, however,
quantum channels cannot be represented as unitary quantum operations:
one is dealing with some characteristic irreversible transformations.
We will now deﬁne a class of quantum channels that have a special physical
interest. Let a, b, c be complex numbers such that |a|2 + |b|2 + |c|2 ≤ 1.
Consider the following system of Kraus operators of C2:
E0 =
√
1− |a|2 − |b|2 − |c|2 I
E1 = |a|σx
E2 = |b|σy
E3 = |c|σz
(where σx, σy, σz are the three Pauli matrices).
Deﬁne a,b,cE(1) as follows for any ρ ∈ D(C2):
a,b,cE(1)ρ =
3∑
i=0
Ei ρE
†
i .
We have:
a,b,cE(1)ρ = (1− |a|2 − |b|2 − |c|2)ρ+ |a|2σxρσx + |b|2σyρσy + |c|2σzρσz.
One can prove that for any choice of a, b, c (such that |a|2+ |b|2+ |c|2 ≤ 1),
the map a,b,cE(1) is a quantum channel of the space C2.
Let us now refer to the Bloch-sphere (whose radius is 1) that is in one-to
one correspondence with D(C2).7 Any map a,b,cE(1) induces the following
7We recall that the bijection f from the Bloch-sphere onto D(C2) is determined as
follows: for any x, y, z ∈ R such that |x|2+|y|2+|z|2 ≤ 1, f(x, y, z) = 1
2
(I+xσx+yσy+zσz).
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vector-transformation (the sphere is deformed into an ellipsoid centered at
the origin): ⎛⎝ xy
z
⎞⎠ →
⎛⎝ (1− 2|b|2 − 2|c|2) x(1− 2|a|2 − 2|c|2) y
(1− 2|a|2 − 2|b|2) z
⎞⎠
For particular choices of a, b and c, one obtains some special cases of
quantum channels.
• For a = b = c = 0, one obtains the identity operator.
• For b = c = 0, one obtains the bit-ﬂip channel aBF (1) that ﬂips
the two canonical bits (represented as the projection operators IP
(1)
0
and IP
(1)
1 ) with probability |a|2:
IP
(1)
0 → (1− |a|2) IP (1)0 + (|a|2) IP (1)1 ;
IP
(1)
1 → (1− |a|2) IP (1)1 + (|a|2) IP (1)0 .
The sphere is mapped into an ellipsoid with x as symmetry-axis (see
Fig. 1).
Figure 1. The bit-ﬂip channel
• For a = c = 0, one obtains the bit-phase-ﬂip channel bBPF (1) that
ﬂips both bits and phase with probability |b|2. The sphere is mapped
into an ellipsoid with y as symmetry-axis.
• For a = b = 0, one obtains the phase-ﬂip channel cPF (1) that ﬂips
the phase with probability |c|2. The sphere is mapped into an ellip-
soid with z as symmetry-axis.
• For |a|2 = |b|2 = |c|2 = p4 (with p ≤ 1), one obtains the depolarizing
channel pD(1). If p = 1, the polarization along any direction is equal
to 0. The sphere is contracted by a factor 1 − p and the center of
the sphere is a ﬁxed point.
The channels we have considered above have been deﬁned with respect
to the canonical truth-perspective I. However, as expected, they can be
naturally transposed to any truth-perspective T. Given E (1) such that
EPISTEMIC FIRST-ORDER SEMANTICS 23
E(1)ρ = ∑3i=0Ei ρE†i , the twin-channel E (1)T of E(1) can be deﬁned as fol-
lows:
E (1)T ρ :=
∑
i
TEiT
† ρTE†iT
†.
So far we have only considered quantum channels of the space C2. At the
same time, any operation E(1)T (deﬁned on C2) can be canonically extended
to an operation E(n)T deﬁned on the space H(n) (for any n > 1). Consider
a density operator ρ of H(n) and the reduced state Red(2)[n−1,1](ρ) (which
describes the n-th subsystem of the composite system described by ρ). We
have: pT(ρ) = Tr(
TP
(1)
1 Red
(2)
[n−1,1](ρ)). In other words, the T-probability of
ρ only depends on the T-probability of the reduced state that describes the
n-th subsystem. On this basis, it is reasonable to deﬁne E (n)T as follows:
E(n)T = I(n−1) ⊗ E(1)T .
Notice that, generally, a quantum channel does not represent a knowledge-
operation. We have, for instance, for some density operators ρ:
pI(
aBF (1)ρ)  pI(ρ),
against the deﬁnition of knowledge-operation, if ρ is supposed to belong to
the epistemic domain of aBF (1). At the same time, by convenient choices
of the epistemic domains, our quantum channels can be transformed into
knowledge-operations.
Deﬁnition 6.2. (A bit-ﬂip knowledge-operation aKBF
(n)
T )
Let a 	= 0. Deﬁne aKBF(n)T as follows:
(1) EpD(aKBF
(n)
T ) ⊆ D = {ρ ∈ D(H(n)) | pT(ρ) ≥ 12}.
In other words an agent (whose knowledge-operation is aKBF
(n)
T )
has only access to pieces of information that are not “too far from
the truth”.
(2) ρ ∈ EpD(aKBF(n)T ) ⇒ aKBF(n)T ρ = aBF (n)T ρ.
Theorem 6.1.
(i) Any aKBF
(n)
T is a knowledge-operation. In particular,
aKBF
(n)
T is
a non-trivial knowledge operation if there exists at least one ρ ∈
EpD(aKBF
(n)
T ) such that pT(ρ) >
1
2 .
(ii) the set D is the maximal set such that the corresponding aKBF
(n)
T
is a knowledge-operation.
(iii) Let |a|2 ≤ 12 and let EpD(aKBF
(n)
T ) = D. The following closure
property holds: for any ρ ∈ D, aKBF(n)T ρ ∈ D.
Proof. (i)-(ii) Suppose that ρ ∈ EpD(aKBF(n)T ) ⊆ D and let us represent
the density operator T†Red(2)[n−1,1](ρ)T as
1
2(I + xσx + yσy + zσz). We have:
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pT(
aKBF
(n)
T ρ) = Tr(
TP
(n)
1
aKBF
(n)
T ρ) = Tr(T
IP
(1)
1 T
†∑
i TEiT
†Red(2)[n−1,1](ρ)
TE†iT
†) = Tr( IP (1)1
∑
iEiT
†Red(2)[n−1,1](ρ)TE
†
i ) =
1−(1−2|a|2)z
2 ;
pT(ρ) = Tr(
TP
(n)
1 ρ) = Tr(T
IP
(1)
1 T
†Red(2)[n−1,1](ρ)) =
1−z
2 .
Hence, pT(
aKBF
(n)
T ρ) ≤ pT(ρ) ⇔ (1− 2|a|2)z ≥ z ⇔ z ∈ [−1, 0] ⇔ pT(ρ) ≥
1
2 .
Thus, aKBF
(n)
T is a knowledge operation and the set D is the maximal set
such that the corresponding aKBF
(n)
T is a knowledge operation.
(iii) pT(
aKBF
(n)
T ρ) =
1−(1−2|a|2)z
2 ≥ 12 , since |a|2 ≤ 12 and z ∈ [−1, 0]. 
In a similar way one can deﬁne knowledge-operations that correspond
to the phase-ﬂip channel, the bit-phase-ﬂip channel and the depolarizing
channel.
Truth-perspectives are, in a sense, similar to diﬀerent reference-frames
in relativity. Accordingly, one could try and apply a “relativistic” way of
thinking in order to describe how a given agent can “see” the logical behavior
of another agent.
As an example let us refer to two agents Alice and Bob, whose truth-
perspectives are TAlice and TBob, respectively. Let {|1Alice〉, |0Alice〉} and
{|1Bob〉, |0Bob〉} represent the systems of truth-values of our two agents. Fur-
thermore, for any canonical gate DG(n) (deﬁned with respect to the canoni-
cal truth-perspective I), let DG
(n)
Alice and
DG
(n)
Bob represent the corresponding
twin-gates for Alice and for Bob, respectively.
According to the rule assumed in Section 2, we have:
DG
(n)
Alice =
D(T
(n)
AliceG
(n)T
(n)†
Alice).
In a similar way in the case of Bob.
We will adopt the following conventional terminology.
• When |1Bob〉 = a0|0Alice〉+a1|1Alice〉, we will say that Alice sees that
Bob’s Truth is a0|0Alice〉 + a1|1Alice〉. In a similar way, for Bob’s
Falsity.
• When DG(n)Alice = D(T(n)AliceG(n)T(n)†Alice) and DG(n)Bob = D(T(n)BobG(n)T(n)†Bob ) =
DG
(n)
1Alice
(where DG(n) and DG
(n)
1 are canonical gates), we will say
that Alice sees Bob using the gate DG
(n)
1Alice
in place of her gate
DG
(n)
Alice.
• When DG(n)Alice = DG(n)Bob we will say that Alice and Bob see and
use the same gate, which represents (in their truth-perspective) the
canonical gate DG(n).
On this basis, one can conclude that, generally, Alice sees a kind of “de-
formation” in Bob’s logical behavior. As an example, suppose that Alice
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has the canonical truth-perspective (i.e. TAlice = I
(1)), while Bob’s truth-
perspective is the Hadamard-operator (i.e. TBob =
√
I
(1)
). Accordingly, the
truth-values systems of Alice and of Bob are the following:
• {|1Alice〉, |0Alice〉} = {|1〉, |0〉};
• {|1Bob〉, |0Bob〉} =
{
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)
}
,
In such a case, Alice will see a quite strange behavior in Bob’s use of the
logical connective negation. Since DNOT
(1)
Bob =
D(
√
I
(1)
NOT(1)
√
I
(1)†
), we will
obtain, for instance, that:
DNOT
(1)
Bob
IP
(1)
1 =
IP
(1)
1 = P
(1)
1√
2
(|0Bob〉−|1Bob〉).
In other words, Alice sees that Bob’s negation of her Truth is her Truth
itself, which represents instead an intermediate truth-value for Bob.
We can also consider a third agent Eve whose truth-perspective is the
following: TEve =
(
cos(π
8
) sin(π
8
)
− sin(π
8
) cos(π
8
)
)
. In such a case, Alice will see Eve
using the Hadamard-gate in place of her negation, i.e.,
DNOT
(1)
Eve =
D
√
I
(1)
Alice.
As expected, generally, diﬀerent agents with diﬀerent truth-perspectives
will see and use diﬀerent gates. An interesting question is the following:
can diﬀerent agents (with diﬀerent truth-perspectives) see and use the same
gate corresponding to a given canonical gate? The following theorem gives
a positive answer to this question, in the case of same special gates.
Theorem 6.2. Let DG(n) be one of the following canonical gates: the nega-
tion DNOT(n), the Hadamard-gate D
√
I
(n)
.
(i) There is an inﬁnite set of agents such that for any i and j belonging
to this set:
(i.1) i and j see and use the same gate corresponding to the canonical
gate DG(n);
(i.2) if i 	= j, then Ti and Tj are not probabilistically equivalent (in
other words, pTi(ρ) 	= pTj(ρ), for some qumix ρ);
(ii) There is an inﬁnite set of agents (with diﬀerent truth-perspectives
Ti) who see and use diﬀerent gates
DG
(n)
Ti
, all diﬀerent from the
canonical gate DG(n). In other words, for any i and j belonging to
this set:
(ii.1) if i 	= j, then DG(n)Ti 	= DG
(n)
Tj
;
(ii.2) DG
(n)
Ti
	= DG(n).
Proof.
(i) Consider the set of truth-perspectives having the following form:
T(θ) =
(
cos( θ2) −i sin( θ2)
−i sin( θ2) cos( θ2)
)
.
There are inﬁnitely many θ ∈ [0, 2π) such that:
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(i.1) DG
(n)
T(θ) =
DG(n).
(i.2) If θ 	= θ′, then T(θ) and T(θ′) are not probabilistically equiva-
lent.
(ii) Consider the set of truth-perspectives having the following form:
T′(θ) =
(
cos( θ2)− i√2 sin(
θ
2) − i√2 sin(
θ
2)
− i√
2
sin( θ2) cos(
θ
2) +
i√
2
sin( θ2)
)
.
There are inﬁnitely many θ ∈ (0, 2π) such that:
(ii.1) if θ 	= θ′, then DG(n)T(θ) 	= DG
(n)
T(θ′);
(ii.2) DG
(n)
T(θ) 	= DG(n).

7. Quantifiers as qumix operations
Now we want to extend our semantics to the full ﬁrst-order language L.
As is well known, in most semantic approaches the interpretation of the
universal quantiﬁer ∀ generally involves an inﬁnitary procedure that cannot
be represented as a ﬁnite computational step.
What kind of intuitive reasons induce us to assert the truth of a univer-
sal sentence (say, “All humans are mortal”, “All neutrinos have a non-null
mass”,....)? In the happiest situations we can base our assertion on a the-
oretical proof (which generally gives rise to a kind of “by-pass”). In other
situations we may refer to an empirical evidence or to an inductive extrap-
olation. Sometimes we are simply proposing a conjecture or even an act of
faith.
Consider the following simple example of a universal sentence:
α = ∀xP1x.
We have: AtStr(α) = (3); Hα = H(3)
The syntactical tree of α is:
Levelα2 = (P
1x)
Levelα1 = (∀xP1x)
Once chosen a truth-perspective T, is it possible to obtain an appropriate
T-gate tree for α?
Any model HolT will assign a qumix to the top level of the syntactical tree
of α:
HolT : (P
1x) → ρ ∈ D(H(3)).
Hence, we shall look for an operation ∀QT (which is deﬁned on H(3) and
depends on T) such that:
HolT((∀xP1x)) = ∀QTρ
A very reasonable condition that should be required seems to be the
following:
pT(
∀QTρ) ≤ pT(ρ).
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Semantically, this condition is important because it is connected with the
validity of the Dictum de omni-Principle ( ∀xP1x  P1x).
Interestingly enough, one is dealing with a requirement that also char-
acterizes knowledge-operations. As we have seen in Section 5, for any
ρ ∈ EpD(K(n)T ) we have: pT(K(n)T ρ) ≤ pT(ρ). And we already know that
knowledge-operations cannot be generally represented as unitary quantum
operations. As happens in the case of epistemic operators, quantiﬁers also
can be interpreted as special examples of qumix operations that are gener-
ally irreversible. Unlike logical connectives, the use of quantiﬁers seems to
involve a kind of theoretic “jump”, quite similar to quantum measurement-
phenomena.
Of course, not all universal formulas are so simple as ∀xP1x. Consider,
for instance, the following sentence:
α = ∀x(P1x ∧P2ax) = ∀x(ᵀ(P1x,P2ax, f))
(say, All are nice and Alice likes them).
We have: AtStr(α) = (3, 4, 1); Hα = H(3) ⊗H(4) ⊗H(1) = H(8).
Here ∀ binds the variable x in two diﬀerent occurrences of x in two dif-
ferent subformulas of α. How can such syntactical features be reﬂected
at a semantical level? Fortunately (unlike classical semantics), the quan-
tum computational semantics has an intensional character that allows us to
“preserve the memory” of the linguistic complexity of all formulas.
In the case of the sentence α = ∀x(ᵀ(P1x,P2ax, f)), the behavior of
the quantiﬁer ∀ can be associated to a syntactical conﬁguration, formally
described by the following conventional notation:
(1[1], 2[2], (3, 4, 1)).
The interpretation of (1[1], 2[2], (3, 4, 1)) is: ∀ binds the ﬁrst variable of the
ﬁrst atomic subformula occurring in α and the second variable of the second
atomic subformula occurring in α, while (3, 4, 1) is the atomic structure of
α.
This notation can be naturally generalized. Any universal formula
α = ∀xδ
can be associated to a syntactical conﬁguration (called quantiﬁer-conﬁguration)
that will be represented as follows:
qconfα = (m1[d
m1
1 , . . . , d
m1
u ], . . . ,mr[d
mr
1 , . . . , d
mr
v ], (n1, . . . , nk)),
where: r ≤ At(α) = n1 + . . .+ nk.
The interpretation of qconfα is the expected one. Of course, diﬀerent
formulas may have the same quantiﬁer conﬁguration. Since any quantum
conﬁguration qconf refers to a particular atomic structure, it turns out that
qconf determines the semantic spaceHqconf of all formulas whose quantiﬁer-
conﬁguration is qconf .
On this basis, we can now introduce the notions of T-quantiﬁer map and
of ﬁrst-order epistemic realization for the language L.
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Deﬁnition 7.1. (T-Quantiﬁer map)
A T-quantiﬁer map is a a map QT that associates to any quantiﬁer-conﬁguration
qconf a qumix operation QT(qconf), deﬁned on the space Hqconf . The fol-
lowing condition is required for any qumix ρ of Hqconf :
pT([QT(qconf)]ρ) ≤ pT(ρ).
Deﬁnition 7.2. (First-order epistemic realization)
A ﬁrst-order epistemic realization for L is a triplet (HolT,ET,QT), where
HolT is a holistic map for the language L, ET is an epistemic map (which
associates to any pair (α, t) consisting of a formula α and of a term t occur-
ring in an epistemic connective Kt of α an epistemic situation ET(α, t) =
(THolαT(t), KHol
α
T(t)
)) and QT is a quantiﬁer map.
As happens for the language L−Ep, any ﬁrst-order epistemic realization
(HolT,ET,QT) determines for any formula α a special gate tree, called the
(HolT,ET,QT) - ﬁrst-order epistemic pseudo gate tree of α. As an example,
consider the sentence:
α = ¬∀xP1x.
The syntactical tree of α is:
Levelα3 = (P
1x)
Levelα2 = (∀xP1x)
Levelα1 = (¬∀xP1x)
Accordingly, the (HolT,ET,QT) - ﬁrst-order epistemic pseudo gate tree of α
can be naturally identiﬁed with the following pseudo-gate sequence:
(QT(qconf
∀xP1x), DNOT(3)T ).
On this basis, we can now deﬁne the concept of holistic model for the
language L.
Deﬁnition 7.3. (Holistic model of L)
A holistic model of L is a ﬁrst-order epistemic realization (HolT,ET,QT)
that satisﬁes the following conditions for any formula α.
(1) Let (DG
(HolT,ET,QT)
T(h−1)
, . . . , DG
(HolT,ET,QT)
T(1)
) be the (HolT,ET,QT) - ﬁrst-
order epistemic pseudo gate tree of α and let 1 ≤ i < h. Then,
HolT(Leveli(α)) =
DG
(HolT,ET,QT)
T(i)
(HolT(Leveli+1(α))).
The meaning of each level (diﬀerent from the top level) is obtained
by applying the corresponding gate (or pseudo-gate) to the meaning
of the level that occurs immediately above.
(2) Contextual Dictum de omni
Suppose that ∀xβ(x) and β(t1) ∧ . . . ∧ β(tn) are both subformulas of
α. Then,
pT(Hol
α
T(∀xβ(x))) ≤ pT(HolαT(β(t1) ∧ . . . ∧ β(tn))).
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The concepts of truth, validity and logical consequence for the language
L can be now deﬁned like in the case of L−Ep, mutatis mutandis.
It is worth-while noticing that, unlike most ﬁrst-order semantic approaches,
our holistic models do not refer to any domain of individuals dealt with as
a closed set (in a classical sense). Generally, any context γ contains a ﬁ-
nite number of individual terms for which any model provides contextual
meanings. At the same time, the interpretation of a universal formula does
not require “ideal tests” that should be performed on all elements of a
hypothetical domain (which might be highly indeterminate). In a sense,
we could say that the universe of discourse associated to a given holistic
model behaves here as a kind of open set . This way of thinking seems to
be in agreement with a number of concrete semantic phenomena, where the
individual-domain cannot be precisely determined in an extensional way. In
fact, many universal sentences that are currently asserted either in common-
life contexts or in scientiﬁc theories (say, “All teenagers like danger”, “All
photons are bosons”) do not generally refer to closed domains. Such situa-
tions, however, do not prevent a correct use of the universal quantiﬁer.
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